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I s r a e l ’ s  W a l l ,  D i s p l a c e m e n t , 
a n d  P a l e s t i n i a n  R e s i s t a n c e 
i n  t h e  W e s t  B a n k
mazen masri
We managed to create a non-violent body to struggle and ﬁght 
against the apartheid wall. This body is called the Ni’ilin Committee 
Against the Wall. It includes organizations and activists that decided 
to ﬁght the wall in a peaceful and non-violent way. And when we 
say peaceful way we mean that we cannot ﬁght the occupation 
with armed resistance because we know that they are stronger than 
us. But this non-violent struggle is a message to the world that we 
are refusing this wall and occupation, we refuse the Israeli plan that 
wants to kill us. We send a message that this wall is illegal, and we 
are saying it is an unfair apartheid system, and we are sure that it will 
not last forever. Sooner or later, there will come an age, if not in our 
day then for our kids, when we will be celebrating the victory of tear-
ing down this wall.
—ayman nafi ,  Mayor of Ni’ilin, qtd. in “Nilin Village”
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the construction of the wall  by Israel in the West Bank is 
creating various problems. It has restricted the freedom of move-
ment of Palestinians, a/ected their health, welfare, employment, 
and social fabric. It has also led to a wave of displacements, which 
this chapter will focus on. 0e issue of displacement has been a 
concern since the beginning of the construction of the wall. 0e 
International Court of Justice, in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, voiced its concern about the many people it has dis-
placed. 0e court stated:
Since a signiﬁcant number of Palestinians have already been com-
pelled by the construction of the wall and its associated regime to 
depart from certain areas, a process that will continue as more of the 
wall is built, that construction, coupled with the establishment of the 
Israeli settlements…is tending to alter the demographic composition 
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. (International Court of Justice 
para. 133)
Although displacement as a result of the wall has always been a 
concern, monitoring the movement of people from certain areas 
as a result of coercion is somewhat understudied. 0e 3rst study to 
tackle this issue was published in 2006 as a joint project by Badil 
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and 
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Group. 0is project, how-
ever, was only a pilot study focusing solely on the Jerusalem area. 
Other studies have been also published, but most of them are small 
in scale and scope and focused on speci3c areas. To date, there 
has been no comprehensive study to detail trends of movement 
with reliable up-to-date data. Also, there is no monitoring mech-
anism in place to monitor and document displacement. In 2007, 
a group of organizations, including human rights organizations 
and some UN agencies, formed the Permanent Working Group 
on Forced Displacement to monitor and collect data about people 
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who have been displaced in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. But 
this group has made no signi3cant contribution to researching and 
monitoring the ongoing displacement.
Given the human rights violations that are inherent in the con-
struction of the wall, which come in addition to other human 
rights violations that Palestinians have been su/ering from since 
the mass population transfer of 1948,1 the wall and all of its e/ects 
were met with resistance by Palestinian society. 0e continuous 
state of oppression and deprivation of human rights is in essence 
a denial of humanity. Resistance is one of the ways through which 
Palestinians reassert their humanity. Resistance takes di/er-
ent shapes and forms, and, in the case of the Palestinians directly 
a/ected by the wall, the very fact that they are adamantly insisting 
on staying on their lands is seen by many Palestinians as an act of 
resistance in and of itself.
Because of the scarcity of reliable sources, this chapter focuses 
less on facts and 3gures of displacement and more on trends and 
patterns of displacement as well as resistance to it. 0e chapter 
begins, in the next section, by situating the current displacement 
in the context of the way in which the wall has been rationalized in 
Israeli political thought, especially the prevailing Zionist notion of 
the legitimacy of transfer. 0e third section provides speci3c details 
about the wall as well as an overview of the political rationale for 
the wall. 0e fourth section focuses on the Palestinian experi-
ence of displacement and the impact of the wall in everyday life. 
Palestinian methods of resistance are the focus of the 3fth section, 
and the 3nal section o/ers concluding remarks.
Historical and Political Context
Since the late nineteenth century, the Zionist project of creat-
ing a settler colonial state in Palestine has had a huge impact on 
the indigenous population.2 One of the main e/ects of this colo-
nization process is displacement. 0is displacement is not a mere 
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by-product of the colonization process. In essence, the transfer 
of the Palestinians was a condition for the Zionist project to suc-
ceed. Zionism, as proclaimed by the First Zionist Congress, which 
convened in Basel in 1897, is a movement that “aims at the cre-
ation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by 
public law” (Basel Programme qtd. Vital 368).3 0is creation of a 
new home could not have happened without two main processes: 
the mass immigration of a Jewish population to Palestine and the 
local population’s agreement or acquiescence to the creation of the 
Jewish state. 0eodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, did 
not seek the approval of the local population in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. What mattered to him was the 
approval of the world’s powers: their support for the Zionist move-
ment would be needed. Dealing with the indigenous population 
was not a major issue as they were not seen by the Zionist move-
ment as a people worth considering, a re?ection of the in?uence 
of the notions of European supremacy on the Zionist movement 
(Masalha, Expulsion 6). Zionist political thought soon began to 
embrace the concept of transfer of the local Palestinian popu-
lation as the solution of the problem of the local population, or 
what soon began to be known in the Zionist discourse as the “Arab 
question.”4
Since the late nineteenth century, transfer became a major 
part of mainstream Zionist political thought. It was thought that 
Jews were the only group that could be seen as a nation and that 
they had “a historic and natural right” over the area of Palestine 
(Masalha, Expulsion 17). 0is right, according to Zionist thought, 
was recognized internationally with the adoption of the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917 and the Declaration in the Deed of Mandate 
over Palestine in 1923. 0e Balfour Declaration and the Deed of 
Mandate were issued by European colonial powers. 0ey did not 
take into consideration the interests of the original inhabitants. 
Nor were they accepted by the indigenous population (Morris 76). 
In fact, the indigenous population fought and resisted them by all 
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means, starting from the early 1920s through strikes, petitions, 
delegations to the British government, and other forms of protest. 
0is resistance continued until the creation of the State of Israel in 
1948. But for the Zionist movement, it did not matter that the peo-
ple who were most a/ected by these policies were never consulted, 
never gave their approval, and had even embarked on a large-scale 
and sometimes violent campaign to reassert their rights and pre-
vent the demise of their nation. 0e same reasoning and processes 
that led the Zionist movement then still shape the policies of the 
state of Israel today: namely, Palestinians have lesser rights than 
the Jewish immigrants, and, therefore, geographically “transfer-
ring” them or implementing apartheid policies against them is 
seen as legitimate.5 0is set of beliefs was seen very clearly dur-
ing the major wave of ethnic cleansing during the 1948 war and its 
aftermath (Pappe; Masalha, Expulsion). It was also seen, although 
at a slower pace, in the years after the creation of Israel, as well as 
during and after the 1967 war (Masalha, A Land).
In addition to transfer, segregation is a recurring and consistent 
theme in Zionist ideology. As early as the 1920s, Zionist parties 
and groups had encouraged Jewish-only organizations and urged 
the Jewish immigrants not to undertake joint Arab-Jewish initia-
tives. Even in the area of workers’ unions, where one would expect 
workers to come together to have more power against the employ-
ers, the Zionist leadership encouraged separation by creating 
workers’ unions that were organized along national/ethnic lines, as 
opposed to more inclusive unions (Teveth 92–117). It was thought 
that separation on all levels was needed to create an independent 
Jewish state. After the creation of the state, the policy continued, 
but became more acute; it turned into segregation.
0e wall that Israel is in the process of building in the Occupied 
West Bank is yet another intensi3cation of Israel’s transfer and 
segregation policies.6 It a/ects the lives of more than 2.6 million 
Palestinians and actively contributes to further displacement of 
Palestinians by creating severe conditions that force the a/ected 
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communities to leave areas they have been living in for genera-
tions. 0e wall is contemplated as part of the segregation system 
that would stop any mixing between the Palestinian population in 
the Occupied West Bank and the mostly Jewish Israeli population 
in Israel. 0is is not an attempt to stop the ?ow of Israeli settlers 
to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which, according to the 
International Court of Justice, are illegal under international law.7 
It is an attempt to consolidate a strong Jewish majority in Israel 
within the 1949 borders and to strengthen the separation pol-
icy. 0is, Israeli leaders hope, would prevent a situation whereby 
Palestinians would start an anti-apartheid struggle demanding full 
national and political rights under one state, as opposed to the cur-
rent demands of the oYcial leadership of the Palestinian people to 
independence in a sovereign Palestinian state.8 From a contempo-
rary Zionist perspective, a two-state solution that would create a 
Palestinian state alongside Israel is more desirable. 0e creation of 
such a state would be used by Israel as a way to avoid the respon-
sibility for the expulsion of the Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 
to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel. 0is would come mainly 
at the expense of Palestinian refugees and the Palestinians living 
inside Israel who do not enjoy full civil and political rights.
To prevent the struggle from shifting to a “one-person, one-
vote” struggle, Israel has three options. 0e 3rst is to control the 
growth rate of the Palestinian population. 0e second is to phys-
ically expel large numbers of them to other areas. Both of these 
options are not very likely today, which leaves Israel with a third 
option: giving up Israeli civilian presence in areas that are heav-
ily populated with Palestinians such as Gaza and parts of the 
West Bank where, according to the two-state solution, a future 
Palestinian state would be established. Areas in the West Bank, 
which Israel sees as strategic, but that are not heavily populated 
with Palestinians, would remain under Israeli control. 0e possible 
fate of Palestinians who live in such areas of the West Bank—areas 
marked by Isreal to remain under Israeli control—has not been 
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determined. Because Israel sees Palestinians as a demographic 
threat, it is conceivable that Israel will not grant them Israeli cit-
izenship. Still, they will be in areas that Israel will treat as part 
of Israel proper, with very few, if any, rights. 0ose communities 
are the most vulnerable communities under Israel’s displacement 
policy because their location is an obstacle to Israeli strategic inter-
ests. 0e displacement of those communities has already started.
!e Wall: History, Form, and Details
While the idea of creating a barrier in the West Bank can be traced 
back to the late 1990s, the idea for the construction of a combi-
nation of an eight-metre-high wall, razor wires, sniper towers, 
trenches, military roads, electronic surveillance devices, and buf-
fer zones began to be implemented in 2002. 0is system is now 
about 760 kilometres long, and it cuts through and surrounds 
Palestinian villages and towns. Vast tracts of the land on which the 
wall is built are private property that was expropriated by Israel’s 
military authorities. In some places, the bu/er zone is up to 100 
metres wide, adding more to the misery of the local population. 
0e construction of the wall is a huge project: from the beginning 
of construction until December 2006, it entailed digging up and 
moving 38.7 million cubic metres of earth, using one million cubic 
metres of concrete to create the slabs that form the wall, and pav-
ing 2.25 million square kilometres of asphalted military roads. 
More than 3fty-three contractors were hired to carry out the con-
struction of the wall, using plans created by sixty planning and 
architecture oYces (“Israel’s Security Fence”).
0e wall deviates signi3cantly from the 1949 armistice line (also 
known as the Green Line), which sets the borders between the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, occupied in 1967, and areas under 
Israeli sovereignty, which have been controlled by Israel since 
1948.9 0ese deviations make the wall twice the length of the Green 
Line. If the construction is completed according to the projected 
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route, 87 per cent of the wall will be inside the West Bank, isolat-
ing approximately 10 per cent of the areas in the West Bank. In a 
number of areas, such as the area south west of Nablus, the wall 
deviates about twenty-two kilometres, creating what is called the 
“Ariel Finger” because it encircles the illegal settlement of Ariel. In 
the vicinity of the Ariel settlement in the northern West Bank and 
the areas around Jerusalem, the deviation is very signi3cant and it 
encompasses dozens of villages and thousands of people.
In a report released in July 2008 by the United Nations OYce 
of the Coordination of Humanitarian A/airs (OCHA) for the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the UN paints a bleak picture of the 
humanitarian situation. About 285,000 Palestinians will be trapped 
in the area between the wall and the Green Line, about 250,000 
of them in the Jerusalem area. Twenty-eight Palestinian villages, 
where 128,000 people live, will be surrounded by the wall on three 
sides. About 26,000 people living in eight communities will be 
totally surrounded by the wall on four sides. 0ese communities 
will be connected to the rest of the West Bank through a tunnel or 
an access road (OCHA, “Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier” 6).
To understand the actual situation on the ground, we also 
need to understand the regime of gates, checkpoints, tunnels, 
bridges, and bypass roads associated with the wall. 0is is a sophis-
ticated system that, together with the wall, aims to control and 
restrict Palestinian presence and traYc in the West Bank. It cre-
ates “Israeli-only roads” for the Israeli settlers in the West Bank 
that forbid Palestinian commuters. A system of tunnels, bridges, 
and checkpoints separate Palestinian traYc from that of Israeli 
settlers. 0e entire system is designed to isolate Palestinian cit-
ies, towns, and villages. Essentially, this system dissects the West 
Bank into four main areas: the northern West Bank, from Jenin 
to south of Nablus; the central area, which includes Ramallah 
and the surrounding villages; the southern West Bank, includ-
ing Hebron, Bethlehem, and surrounding villages; and the Jordan 
Valley, which, because of its location and topography, is very easy 
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to isolate. 0is process has been referred to by Palestinians as the 
“Bantustanization of the West Bank,” associating it with the infa-
mous attempt by South Africa during the apartheid era to create 
political entities for the native African population that would be 
presented as independent states, although they were totally domi-
nated by South Africa (Farsakh).
0e system of segregation, of which the wall is the most dra-
matic manifestation, did not develop and evolve as a matter of 
mere coincidence or as a result of security needs. Security is always 
cited by Israel and its supporters as the only justi3cation for the 
wall. 0is has been the case in almost all of the propaganda of the 
Israeli government and in the submissions of the Israeli govern-
ment before the Supreme Court of Israel in petitions 3led against 
the construction of the wall.10 Yet, a deeper analysis of the situa-
tion, a more thorough understanding of how the Israeli political 
system operates, and a closer look at the statements issued by 
Israeli oYcials show otherwise. Even the International Court of 
Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the wall was not convinced that 
the route of the wall was chosen to attain security objectives  
(para. 137).
Since 2001, the Israeli political system has been undergoing a 
shift in strategy. Israeli leadership, mainly under former Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, came to grips with the fact that the 
state of prolonged occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
and the apartheid situation there is not tenable in the long run. 
Demographic pressure and international censure would turn the 
whole area of historic Palestine into a single state where Israelis 
and Palestinians would have equal rights, as opposed to the sit-
uation since 1967, whereby in the same geographical unit one 
national/ethnic group has monopoly over power and resources.
0e situation of prolonged occupation and the apartheid real-
ity has also increased the tension inside Israel. Israel de3nes itself 
as a Jewish and democratic state. 0is statement by itself is con-
tradictory. Critics say that the way Israel de3nes the Jewishness of 
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the state is not compatible with democracy (Bishara). On the one 
hand, a democratic state should allow political participation of all 
its subjects; on the other hand, in order for a state to be “a Jewish 
state,” it has to have a signi3cant Jewish majority among its cit-
izens. 0e current situation whereby millions of disenfranchised 
Palestinians are under Israeli control intensi3es the contradic-
tion and the tension in this de3nition. It brings the situation 
closer to a critical point where one of the two elements of the def-
inition should be dropped—either an undemocratic Jewish state 
or a non-Jewish democracy. 0e analysis and understanding of 
this situation could be seen clearly in the platform of the Kadima 
party, which was the ruling party of Israel from 2003 to 2009. 0eir 
platform highlights the assertion that the Jewish people have 
“national and historic rights” over all of Erertz Yesra’el (all of his-
toric Palestine, not only Israel) and emphasizes the importance of 
Jewish sovereignty and Jewish majority; it then adds, “[G]iving up 
a part of the Eretz Yesra’el is not giving up ideology, but it is exercis-
ing the ideology that aims at securing the existence of a Jewish and 
democratic state in the Land of Israel” (“Political Action Plan”). In 
essence, the platform recognizes that maintaining e/ective control 
over the Palestinian population is a threat to the Jewish major-
ity, and in order to maintain the Jewish majority, it is important to 
give up parts of Eretz Yesra’el that constitute a threat to that major-
ity—that is, areas that are heavily populated by Palestinians.
Faced with this prospect, the Sharon government embarked on 
a plan to “separate” from the Palestinians. 0e plan was 3rst called 
the “Separation Plan” but was then changed to the “Disengagement 
Plan” because of the negative connotations of the apartheid phi-
losophy that accompany the term “separation.” 0e underlying 
assumptions for the plan were that Palestinians do not seem to be 
going anywhere in the near future; also, the prospects of achieving 
a peace treaty with them are not good. 0ere was a need, therefore, 
for a way to minimize the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territory 
and, at the same time, keep the areas that Israel is interested in 
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either because of their strategic value or because of their resources 
(mainly water). 0is strategy would separate the Palestinian and 
the Israeli populations, prevent the creation of a single bi-national 
state, and allow Israel to maintain control of the areas its settlers 
withdraw from, as well as to continue to exploit resources, such as 
water. 0is strategy was also needed to maintain a Jewish major-
ity in Israel, so that it would continue to be a Jewish state. 0e plan 
had two major steps. 0e 3rst step was to initiate, plan, and start 
working on the construction of the wall and the associated regime 
of controlled roads, gates, and checkpoints in the West Bank. 0e 
second step was to pull the Israeli settlers and military facilities 
from the Gaza Strip, which was already surrounded by a fence, and 
to control it from outside.
0e wall, therefore, is part of a bigger segregation plan. Although 
security was cited as the reason for its construction, in reality, the 
wall is a strong tool for consolidating Israeli control and seizing 
Palestinian land. 0ese purposes are reaYrmed in statements by 
Israeli leaders, who state time and again that the route of the wall 
will be the border between Israel and the future Palestinian state. 
0is walled state will be a Palestinian state according to Israeli 
design. 0is con3ned state is seen today as a vital Israeli interest 
because it will help reduce the tensions between the democratic 
component and the Jewish component in Israeli self-de3nition.
Impact on the Palestinian Population and Modes  
of Displacement
No matter where Palestinians live in the West Bank, the wall 
a/ects them in one way or another. It a/ects all aspects of life, 
including access to land, employment, healthcare, education, and 
livelihood. It a/ects family life, social relations, and other vital 
needs. 0is section focuses on the e/ect of displacement and not 
all of the other human rights e/ects, even though they are interre-
lated: the violation of human rights usually triggers displacement. 
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How the wall a/ects Palestinians and causes displacement varies 
from one area to another, depending on the immensity of human 
rights violations and the way the wall a/ects the di/erent areas. 
In this section, I consider two kinds of displacement caused by the 
wall: direct displacement and indirect displacement.
Direct Displacement
Situations of direct displacement mainly a/ect population cen-
tres that are completely surrounded by the wall or very close to 
the wall. 0e intensity of the e/ects of the wall varies. In some 
places, houses and property have been destroyed and expropri-
ated to build the wall. For example, in the case of Nazlet Issa in 
the northern West Bank, the Israeli military authorities demol-
ished a number of residential and commercial buildings to clear 
the route for the wall. Displacement also occurs through proposals 
to relocate entire communities outright to accommodate the new 
political geography created by the wall. For example, two Bedouin 
communities, Arab Aramadin and Arab Abu Farada, which are both 
trapped in a closed zone near Qalqilya, have been explicitly pro-
posed for dislocation (Hass). 0is mode of displacement seems to 
a/ect mostly villages and population centres that are trapped in 
the areas where the wall deviates from the Green Line. Such dis-
placement means that these villages are west of the wall, on the 
“Israeli” side. Although the wall’s route was designed to include 
those villages on the “Israeli” side of the wall, essentially annexing 
them to Israel, Israel is only interested in annexing the land—
not the people living on it. Residents of these areas still hold 
Palestinian Authority (PA) issued identity cards and are seen as PA 
residents. 0ey will not be entitled to any of the rights that Israeli 
citizens, or even residents, enjoy.
Closed Zones
0e situation in isolated areas, where about 10,000 people live in 
the north section of the West Bank alone and which Israel usually 
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refers to as “closed areas,” is inhumane. Because their homes are 
now on the “Israeli” side of the wall, residents of the closed areas, 
aged sixteen and above, are required to obtain “permanent resi-
dent” permits, and must renew them every six months to be able 
to continue to live in their homes. 0ese permits are not always 
granted. A 2007 study conducted by OCHA and the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) counted the number of people in fourteen of the 3fteen 
communities in the closed areas in the northern West Bank who 
could not obtain permits. 0e study reported that twenty-six men, 
eighty-one women, and four children were not able to get “perma-
nent resident” permits (OCHA, “0e Barrier Gate” 6). 0e denial 
of permits means that these people will not be able to leave their 
homes under any condition because, if they do, they risk not being 
able to get back to them. 0ey are essentially con3ned to their 
villages. As mentioned, the numbers here only refer to the north-
ern West Bank, and the available data is not comprehensive. It is 
mostly based on information received from the community oY-
cials. A deeper and more methodical survey is likely to show that 
the number of those who cannot risk leaving their villages is actu-
ally higher.
Furthermore, the wall in these closed areas has separated the 
residents from most essential services. 0e residents there rely on 
the bigger urban centres of the West Bank, located east of the wall, 
for their healthcare, education, and daily supplies. Because of the 
wall, the residents can only access that area through gates. 0ese 
gates are only open during speci3c hours and do not allow twenty-
four-hour access. 0is means that people who come back late 
from work, for example, outside the closed area are not allowed to 
return to their homes. Worse, it also means that no ambulances are 
able to access those communities when the gates are closed. 0is is 
a serious problem given that most of those communities have no 
local healthcare facilities. In fact, nowadays it is common practice 
for expectant mothers to leave the closed areas weeks before the 
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expected day of delivery because there is no guarantee that when 
their labour begins they will be able to leave the closed zone.
0e wall in the closed areas also has a huge e/ect on social rela-
tions. Any person who wishes to enter the closed area is required 
to get a visitor permit from the Israeli Civil Administration. 0ese 
permits are required for any person who is attending a wedding, 
funeral, or any other social event. In some cases, marriages are 
a/ected by this system of permits. Even for those who hold valid 
permits to pass through the gates, treatment at the gates is often 
violent and humiliating, and entails waiting for long hours.
All of these hardships and restrictions are diYcult to cope with. 
While there is still no study of the psychological e/ects on the pop-
ulation in that area, which essentially lives in an open-air prison, 
some surveys addressing the issue of displacement have been con-
ducted. 0e OCHA-UNRWA study from 2007 reports that 3 per 
cent of the population surveyed have left their area of residence as 
a result of the wall. Although it is not the publically stated policy 
of the Israeli government, there is very little doubt that this is the 
actual objective. Add all these conditions to the legitimacy of the 
idea of transfer in the Zionist and Israeli political thought and one 
is left with almost no doubt about the real goals of the wall and the 
Israeli policy.
If displacement as a policy objective is a matter of inference 
and prediction in the case of some closed areas, the Israeli author-
ities eliminated any reason for doubt in the case of the villages 
Arab Aramadin and Arab Abu Farada. Both are small villages: 
Arab Aramadin has a population of 270 and Arab Abu Farada has a 
population of 120. 0ey were founded in the 1950s by Bedouin ref-
ugees who were expelled as part of the ethnic cleansing that took 
place in 1948.11 0e villages are located in the closed zone near the 
Palestinian town of Qalqilya, which is itself completely surrounded 
by the wall. Representatives from the villages have submitted a 
number of complaints to the Israeli army challenging the route 
of the wall. In a response letter to the residents’ complaints, the 
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representatives of the Israeli army have plainly stated that the 
army is contemplating the idea of o/ering the residents of both vil-
lages the option to move to another location east of the wall.12
While displacement is a constant threat that looms over resi-
dents of Arab Aramdin and Arab Abu Farada, forcible displacement 
was the fate of the residents of Khirbet Qasa, a small village of 
about 270 people in the Hebron area in the southern West Bank. 
0is village was located in an area that is east of the Green Line, 
but west of the wall—an area that Israel wants to annex. On 
October 25, 2007, the whole village was razed to the ground. 0e 
residents were not even given enough time to gather their belong-
ings. Although the residents lived in that area since they were 
expelled from what is now Israel in 1948, the army said that those 
houses and huts were built without permits and therefore should 
be demolished. 0is was the excuse that the Israeli authorities used 
for destroying a whole village that existed before Israel occupied 
the area (Betselem).
Indirect Displacement
0e wall and its associated regime cause displacement even in areas 
that are not totally surrounded by the wall. In many villages along 
the wall’s route, the wall stands between the residential areas of 
the villages and their agricultural areas. Although in some areas 
Israel has allowed the passage of farmers to their agricultural land 
through special gates, the gate system fails to address the prob-
lem. 0e army only allows farmers who hold special permits to 
access their lands through the gates. 0e permits are usually given 
for a period of three months only, and the allocation of those per-
mits is usually done in an arbitrary manner. For example, in 2003, 
the Israeli authorities distributed 630 permits only in the village of 
Jayyus, located in the Qalqilya district in the northern West Bank 
where the wall cuts through 8,600 dunums (one dunum equals 
1,000 square metres) of agricultural lands. Among those who got 
the permits were deceased, emigrants, and minors. More than 
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100 landowners were denied permits. In 2004, the Israeli authori-
ties changed their policy and made the criteria for permit renewal 
stricter. Applicants were required to prove that they own land 
west of the wall by submitting a map of the land in question, a 
land deed, and proof that the land has not been sold. Because of 
the nature of the land laws in the area and because of bureaucratic 
complications, satisfying all of those demands is a very diYcult, 
and oftentimes, impossible task. In addition, current policies limit 
the number of agriculture workers who do not own land from get-
ting permits (OCHA, “0e Humanitarian Impact” 14–16).
0e statistics about Jayyus demonstrate how the gate sys-
tem does not provide reasonable access to agricultural land. 0e 
number of permit holders in Jayyus has dropped from 630 in 
2003 to 250 in 2007. In 2008, only 168 people were granted a per-
mit (OCHA, “0e Humanitarian Impact” 16). 0is leaves most of 
the residents of those villages, who rely heavily on agriculture for 
their livelihood, with limited areas of land to cultivate. As a result, 
the unemployment rates in the villages have risen considerably, 
and the residents, mainly the youth, are forced to start looking 
for alternative forms of employment, usually in urban areas such 
as Ramallah. Because the wall’s associated regime of checkpoints, 
bridges, and tunnels imposes severe restrictions on the movement 
of Palestinians, villagers seeking employment in the urban centres 
are forced to move. In Jayyus, for example, the level of unemploy-
ment has reached about 70 per cent, and residents, especially the 
young and the educated, have begun to leave the village (OCHA, 
“0e Humanitarian Impact” 18–19).
While agricultural areas where the wall passes are drastically 
a/ected, the wall has also a/ected urban areas. A study conducted 
in 2006 by Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and 
Refugee Rights and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
reveals that in the Jerusalem area, 17 per cent of the Palestinians 
who have changed their previous residence (that is, 32.9 per cent of 
Jerusalemites) did so as a direct result of the wall. 0e survey also 
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shows that 63.8 per cent of Palestinians in Jerusalem are consid-
ering changing their place of residence within Jerusalem and its 
suburbs because of the movement restrictions caused by the wall. 
0e major factor that led to displacement at this scale was the way 
restriction of movement made it impossible to achieve an adequate 
standard of living. 0e wall also had negative e/ects on the social 
fabric. According to the survey, 21.4 per cent of all Palestinian 
households in Jerusalem have been split and are separated from 
their relatives. 0e wall also 3gures as an important factor in the 
choice of spouses (Badil 27–31).
0e best way to sum up indirect displacement is to quote para-
graph 134 of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice. In describing the e/ect of the wall on the local population, 
the court said:
The construction of the wall and its associated regime impede the 
liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimi-
lated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They also impede 
the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, 
to education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Resisting the Wall
Palestinians have resisted the colonization of their land since the 
early twentieth century. 0e resistance took di/erent forms and 
had di/erent targets. During the period of the British Mandate, for 
example, the Palestinians were aware of the growing numbers of 
Jewish immigrants from Europe and their plans to create a Jewish 
state in Palestine. Palestinians found di/erent methods to orga-
nize themselves to counter the threatened loss of their homeland. 
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0ese methods ranged from petitions and delegations lobbying the 
British authorities to armed struggle. Most prominent of these 
acts of resistance was the six-month strike in 1936 protesting the 
policies of the British Mandate and the revolt, known as the “Arab 
Revolt,” which started in 1936 and lasted until 1939 (Morris 128). 
0e latter swept all parts of Mandatory Palestine, and the British 
troops were able to suppress the revolt only after using extremely 
brutal tactics (Morris 150). 0e creation of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in 1964, which was recognized as the oYcial 
representative of the Palestinian people, and its subsequent take-
over by Palestinian factions were acts of organizing and resistance 
carried out mostly by refugees who had been displaced in 1948. 
Return to the towns and villages from which they were displaced, 
which is usually one of the demands of displaced people, was one 
of the main goals of the PLO.
Already accustomed to organizing against Israeli pressures, 
Palestinians reacted immediately to the construction of the wall 
in di/erent ways. Although the wall is an act of the state, and an 
apartheid state to be more precise, against a civilian, local popu-
lation, the Palestinians did not take the construction of the wall 
as a fait accompli, but resisted its completion with di/erent strate-
gies. Most Palestinians involved in this resistance also know, from 
di/erent episodes in their struggle, that the power of the state is 
diYcult to challenge and that the deeds of the state are hard to 
reverse. Even knowing that the balance of power leans overwhelm-
ingly against them, they still do not accept the new reality, at least 
not without a 3ght. Of course, because the Israeli army is one of 
the strongest in the world and Israel is the most powerful state in 
the region, the resistance is mainly civilian and mostly non-violent.
One form of resistance, which seems to be the most e/ective, 
is popular organizing. Another form of resistance is formal legal 
action. Despite achieving some success on the international level, 
legal action has largely been a failure. In addition, the construc-
tion of the wall, and the UN’s failure to intervene to stop it, was 
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one of the main triggers for a campaign of “Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions” against Israel (see below for more discussion of the 
BDS).
Popular Organizing
As early as 2002, a campaign called the “Anti-Apartheid Wall 
Campaign” was launched to mobilize against the wall on three 
di/erent levels. 0e 3rst level was the local communities, where 
people on the ground organized popular committees. As of 2008, 
more than 3fty popular local committees have been formed. 0e 
second level is the national level, which coordinates the activities 
of the di/erent local committees. 0e third level is the global one, 
which identi3es the campaign against the wall as part of the global 
struggle against racism and colonialism.
0e campaign is highly focused on grassroots organizing. 0e 
people who are directly a/ected by the wall are the best-suited and 
positioned to lead the struggle against it. Also, the fact that those 
committees are comprised of people who know their regions very 
well makes compiling reliable information possible. 0e high level 
of participation among women and the youth is remarkable. For 
example, in Sal3t and in Tulkarem, two women’s committees were 
formed to mobilize women against the wall (“Stop 0e Wall”).
Providing activists worldwide with reliable and up-to-date 
information about the situation on the ground is one of the most 
important activities of the campaign. With all of the maps, con3s-
cation orders, court decisions, and government resolutions, getting 
a reliable and clear picture of what is happening on the ground 
becomes vital. 0e campaign devotes a lot of resources to research 
and documentation and to disseminating information to a wide 
public, both local and worldwide in various languages.
A good example of popular resistance to the wall is the village 
of Bil’in, west of Ramallah, where the wall has annexed 60 per 
cent of its land. Since 2005, the Bil’in popular resistance commit-
tee against the wall has been organizing peaceful demonstrations 
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on a weekly basis. Palestinians and international solidarity activ-
ists, in addition to some Israeli activists, join forces to resist the 
wall. 0ese demonstrations are often confronted violently by the 
Israeli army. 0e army usually uses tear gas and rubber-coated bul-
lets to disperse the non-violent demonstrators, often leaving some 
demonstrators wounded. On a number of occasions, demonstra-
tors have been killed by the Israeli army. Recently, the Israeli army 
began to experiment with new kinds of weapons and equipment 
that emit strong smells or make unendurable noise.
Due to the damage that this kind of resistance causes to the 
image of Israel internationally, and to the high level of participa-
tion of international solidarity activists, Israeli authorities have 
tried to stop the weekly protest at Bil’in. 0ey try to do this in a 
number of ways, including blocking the access road and declaring 
the area a closed military zone to prevent the activists from get-
ting to the village. 0ose means have not yielded much success 
and did not break the will of the protesters. Although the ongoing 
resistance campaign did not stop the construction of the wall, it 
was successful in delaying construction and raising the awareness 
about the wall and the human rights violations internationally.
Another village that has also been mounting a similar resis-
tance and protest campaign is Ni’ilin. 0e organized resistance in 
this village was able to stop the construction of the wall a number 
of times by vandalizing the heavy equipment that the contractors 
use for doing the groundwork. At one stage, the protesters were 
able to vandalize two kilometres of barbed wire that was laid out 
there to stop them. 0is protest, however, did not come without 
retaliation from the Israeli authorities. In August 2008, two minors 
aged twelve and seventeen were killed by Israeli soldiers during 
the demonstrations. In July 2008, the Israeli authorities decided 
to put an end to the popular resistance of the people on Ni’ilin 
and started a vengeance campaign against the village. 0e village 
was put under curfew, and Israeli soldiers rampaged the village, 
destroying property and arresting the organizers of the popular 
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resistance. 0e curfew was ended only after four days, after 400 
people from the neighboring villages Budrus, Shuqba, Qibbiya, 
Deir Qaddis, Bil’in, Sa/a, and Beit Ur marched to Ni’ilin and broke 
the siege and the curfew imposed on the village.
Resistance !rough Legal Action
With the beginning of the construction of the wall, and after 
the 3rst seizure orders were issued by the Israeli army, many 
Palestinians, desperate to save their lands and livelihood, tried to 
seek legal recourse through the Israeli legal system. Although the 
majority did not really have any great expectations from the Israeli 
courts, for some it looked like one of the few ways to stop the wall. 
Most Palestinians who sought legal remedies were not surprised 
when the remedies were denied, except in a small number of cases. 
Even in the cases that were not a total failure, the success was usu-
ally a small change in the route of the wall, which made the wall 
slightly less destructive. 0e overwhelming majority of Palestinian 
petitions to the Supreme Court of Isreal were rejected. 0is was in 
line with the approach historically taken by the Court, which legal-
ized Israeli settlements and other illegal activities in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Sultany). Under the Supreme Court’s over-
sight, a whole system of apartheid was created.
On the international level, though, the results were much 
better. As a result of discussions in the UN General Assembly, 
the question of the legality of the wall was referrred to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Although the ruling of the 
court would be an advisory opinion, given that Israel does not 
accept ICJ jurisdiction, the court’s opinion still it had an impor-
tant e/ect. Even if it is not enforceable, an advisory opinion from 
the ICJ (the highest authority on international law) asserting that 
the wall is illegal would give much moral support and standing to 
the people resisting it. In July 2004, the ICJ ruled that the wall is 
illegal under international law and that it is a breach of interna-
tional humanitarian law, the laws of occupation, and international 
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human rights law. It also stated that by constructing the wall, 
Israel is impeding “the exercise by the Palestinian people of its 
right to self-determination” (para.122).
Although the legal action through the ICJ was successful in that 
it declared the wall illegal, it was not enforceable against Israel. 
Still, there was some room for further legal action under the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, since the Court has ruled that some of the rules 
violated by Israel include certain obligations characterized as erga 
omnes, that is, obligations imposed on all states not to recognize 
the illegal situation resulting from the wall, and obligations not to 
provide aid and assistance in maintaining the situation created by 
the wall (para. 156–60).13 Unfortunately, the Palestinian leadership 
has not used these openings and has not pursued any further legal 
action.
After making attempts with the Israeli legal system, the peo-
ple of Bil’in decided to try other legal systems. 0e wall on Bil’in 
lands is meant to protect a settlement called Mod’in ‘Illit. Two 
of the construction companies building the residential units in 
this settlement are registered in Canada, which gives Canadian 
courts jurisdiction over their action. In July 2008, Bil’in, repre-
sented by its mayor, 3led a lawsuit in Canada against the two 
Canadian companies, seeking an injunction ordering them to 
cease the construction and return the land to its condition prior 
to the settlement construction. 0e claim, however, was dis-
missed on procedural basis without discussing it on its merits. 
0e court declined jurisdiction, citing forum non conveniens doc-
trine—a doctrine that allows courts to deny jurisdiction even if the 
formal requirements are satis3ed because of little or no connec-
tion between the forum (the court) and the action pursued and the 
existence of a di/erent forum that has stronger connections (Bil’in 
[Village Council] v. Green Park International Inc.).
  ✁ ✂ ✄ ☎ ☎ ✆ ✂ ✝ ✆ ✞ ✟ ☎ ✄ ✄ ✠
Mazen Masri     81
!e Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Campaign
During the Second Intifada, which started in September 2000 (also 
known as Al-Aqsa Intifada), especially after the failure of the Camp 
David negotiations in July of that year, frustration among the 
Palestinians reached new heights. In addition to years of su/ering, 
either from living as refugees or under military occupation, the 
Palestinians had to endure Israel’s brutal policies in dealing with 
the Intifada, which reached an unprecedented level of violence, 
mostly against civilian populations. 0e West Bank and Gaza Strip 
became war zones that Israel attacked periodically using an arsenal 
of weapons that left destruction everywhere. Under these horrible 
conditions, Palestinians began formulating a new approach that 
focused on garnering international support and directing the soli-
darity e/orts towards putting pressure on Israel using non-violent 
means. 0is idea started to gain momentum, and calls for a boy-
cott campaign began to surface in 2002 and 2003. In 2004, there 
was an attempt to coordinate these e/orts with a more structured 
approach to a boycott campaign. 0is led to the creation of the 
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of 
Israel (PACBI), which issued a call for boycott in 2004. 0is call was 
mostly by academics and intellectuals and directed mainly towards 
academics and intellectuals worldwide. It is also mainly focused on 
boycotting Israeli academic and cultural institutions (PACBI Call).
0e construction of the wall, and the failure of international 
law and the international community to stop the construction of 
the wall despite the ICJ Advisory Opinion gave the boycott move-
ment more momentum. One year after the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
was issued, 171 Palestinian civil society organizations issued a 
comprehensive call, calling “upon international civil society organ-
izations and people of conscience all over the world to impose 
broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against 
Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era” 
(“Palestinian Call for Boycott”). 0e civil society organizations also 
appealed to pressure their “respective states to impose embargoes 
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and sanctions against Israel” (“Palestinian Call for Boycott”). 0e 
impact of the wall on the Palestinians and the use of the boy-
cotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) is clearly evident in the 
call. 0e “Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 
Against Israel” begins with the sentence,“One year after the his-
toric Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
which found Israel’s Wall built on occupied Palestinian territory to 
be illegal; Israel continues its construction of the colonial Wall with 
total disregard to the Court’s decision.” It then goes on to describe 
Israel’s activities in the West Bank, stating that Israel “has unilat-
erally annexed occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and 
is now de facto annexing large parts of the West Bank by means 
of the Wall.” Dismantling the wall was also one of the demands of 
the call for boycott, together with ending the occupation and col-
onization of all Arab lands, recognizing the fundamental right 
of Palestinians in Israel to equality, and recognizing the right of 
return of the Palestinian refugees.
0e inclusion of the dismantling of the wall in the call for the 
boycott shows that resisting the wall became one of the unit-
ing elements of Palestinian people everywhere. 0e 2005 call for 
boycott was endorsed by Palestinian civil society organizations, 
including organizations based in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, Israel, and Palestinian refugee organizations and committees 
worldwide. Response to this call was swift. Many groups world-
wide, including workers unions and students unions, responded to 
the boycott call. A lot of responses came in the form of supportive 
resolutions that were adopted by unions and organizations; other 
responses came in the form of action. In February 2009, for exam-
ple, dock workers belonging to the South African Transport and 
Allied Workers Union decided not to ooad a ship carrying Israeli 
goods as part of their BDS activities (“Press Release: Victory for 
Worker Solidarity”).
Since 2005, the number of Palestinians and Palestinian organi-
zations who support BDS as a means of struggle to achieve their 
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rights has been rising steadily. 0e campaign has been gaining 
momentum, and it has begun to crystallize into a mass movement 
that operates on two levels: 1) a local level that utilises popular 
education about the boycott as a means of resistance and urges 
Palestinians not to buy Israeli goods; and 2) an international level, 
whereby Palestinian civil society provides guidance to solidarity 
organizations who wish to conduct solidarity activities in the form 
of BDS. In November 2007, during the 3rst BDS conference, which 
was held in Ramallah, the civil society organizations who called 
for the BDS campaign formed a committee called “0e Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions Campaign National Committee” to bet-
ter coordinate the BDS campaign.
If the South African boycott campaign, which contributed to the 
fall of the apartheid system, is adopted as a benchmark to judge 
the success of the Palestinian campaign, the Palestinian campaign 
seems to be very successful. In less than four years it has achieved 
what took the African National Congress (ANC) years to achieve 
in terms of awareness raising and participation. Of course, this 
success could be attributed to a number of factors, most impor-
tant of which is the progress in communications technology that 
has led to the faster dissemination of the Palestinian call for boy-
cott. Although the success of the Palestinian BDS movement is 
inspiring, it lacks the support of the PLO. As of 2011, the PLO has 
been unwilling to adopt the BDS campaign as an oYcial policy, 
as opposed to the situation in South Africa where the ANC—the 
major political organization in the struggle against apartheid—
adopted boycotts as part of its platform. 0is failure of the PLO 
makes work around the demand for sanctions harder because cam-
paigns for sanctions are targeted at governments who have the 
power to impose sanctions, as opposed to boycotts and divest-
ment, which could be implemented by individuals, corporations, 
and other groups. Notwithstanding the hardships, the BDS cam-
paign is one of the main contemporary Palestinian grassroots 
movements that resisting the wall helped crystallize.
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▶ 0e construction of the wall epitomizes the crimes that Israel 
has committed against the Palestinian people. It represents the 
ugly face of occupation, colonialism, and apartheid. 0ese are 
regimes that, as John Dugard (the former United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian 
Territories Occupied Since 1967) has put it, were identi3ed by the 
international community as inimical to human rights. All of the 
practices and the violations that are part of the wall and the occu-
pation are violations that should be addressed by international 
law, and yet, international law and the international community 
have failed to stop or reverse these violations. 0is failure has been 
repeated in Palestine since 1948, and it seems that its e/ect goes 
beyond the e/ects of other human rights violations. As Dugard has 
said:
In 1994, apartheid came to an end and Palestine became the only 
developing country in the world under the subjugation of a Western-
afﬁliated regime. Herein lies its signiﬁcance to the future of human 
rights. There are other regimes, particularly in the developing world, 
that suppress human rights, but there is no other case of a Western-
afﬁliated regime that denies self-determination and human rights to 
a developing people and that has done so for so long. This explains 
why the opt  [Occupied Palestinian Territories] has become a test for 
the West, a test by which its commitment to human rights is to be 
judged. (para. 63)
He further adds:
If the West, which has hitherto led the promotion of human rights 
throughout the world, cannot demonstrate a real commitment to 
the human rights of the Palestinian people, the international human 
rights movement, which can claim to be the greatest achievement of 
the international community of the past sixty years, will be endan-
gered and placed in jeopardy. (para. 63)
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0e Palestinians, su/ering under the brunt of occupation and 
apartheid, have tried all of the means available for them to resist. 
0ey are still resisting. From international campaigns such as 
“Stop the Wall” to Bi’lin and Ni’ilin villagers who organize against 
the wall, Palestinian people and their allies are determined to 
stop the bulldozers that are destroying their homes and lands. 
0e BDS movement, organized under the banner of the 2005 BDS 
call, which is led by organizations representing workers, students, 
women, artists, and refugees, shows the level of determination and 
commitment of the Palestinians not to resign themselves to the 
miserable fate resulting from Israeli practices. It is a decision to 
take their fate into their hands and to reassert their humanity by 
demanding that Israel and the world respect their human rights. 
While the level of success of the resistance e/orts are hard to mea-
sure at this time, one should bear in mind that the 3ght here is 
against a state with the fourth strongest army in the world, and 
that the resistance is one episode of a century-long struggle.
No tes
1.  0e mass population transfer of 1948 is also known as Nakbah or Nakbe in 
Arabic, which means “catastrophe.” 
2.  0is chapter adopts an approach that views the Israeli-Palestinian con?ict as 
a con?ict between a settler society (Jewish Israelis, migrating from Europe 
and elsewhere) and an indigenous population (Palestinians), which is mainly 
comprised of Arabs (Christian, Muslim, Druze, and Jewish) but also includes 
other ethnicities. See Rodinson, Zureik, Said, Sha3r, Bishara.
3.  It should be noted that there are di/erent streams within the Zionist move-
ment, such as the labour Zionism, revisionist Zionism, religious Zionism, 
and others. 0e de3nition in the accompanying text above refers to political 
Zionism, which we can consider mainstream Zionism. 
4.  0e term “the Arab Question” emerged in the 1920s. It was used to describe 
the issue of how the Zionist movement should deal with the indigenous 
Palestinian population in Palestine (Teveth). In a way, it is a re?ection of how 
Europe saw the presence of Jews in its territory as the “Jewish Question.” 
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5.  For a more detailed analysis of the applicability of the crime of apartheid to 
Israeli policies, see Tilley, “Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?” See also 
MacAllister. 
6.  0e West Bank is the area inside the 1949 armistice line, which outlines the 
western, northern, and southern borders, and the River Jordan and the Dead 
Sea, which form the eastern border. It was occupied by Israel during the 1967 
war, together with the Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip and the Egyptian Sinai 
Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights.
7. 0e Israeli settlements in the West Bank were found to be illegal under inter-
national law by a number of bodies, including the International Court of 
Justice.
8.  In an interview with an Israeli newspaper, Israeli Prime Minsiter, Ehud 
Olemert said, “If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, 
and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights [for the 
Palestinians in the territories], then, as soon as that happens, the State of 
Israel is 3nished” (qtd. in Ben).
9.  Although Israel does not recognize the Green Line as the border line, there 
is international consensus that this line marks the borders between the 
Occupied Territories and Israel. 
10.  See for example the wall’s website http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/
Pages/ENG/default.htm. 
11.  For information about the ethnic cleansing of 1948, see Pappe.
12.  Parts of this letter were quoted in the petition submitted to the Supreme 
Court of Israel in HCJ 10714/06 Mara’ba v. !e Government of Israel. 0e peti-
tion was dismissed.
13.  For accuracy’s sake, I am following the wording of the court ruling here. My 
interpretation of the ruling is that other states need not submit themselves 
to Israel’s demands that they overlook the illegal situation and not provide 
assistance.
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